











Innovation under the sway  




Os Estados Unidos ainda têm a base de P&D mais robusta do mundo e 
gozam de uma clara liderança em tecnologias militares. Google, Apple e 
Microsoft detêm o controle quase total do fluxo global de informações. 
Por trás dessa situação, no entanto, o trabalho feito por brilhantes pesqui-
sadores americanos levanta questões importantes relacionadas, notada-
mente, aos efeitos da financeirização, muitas vezes desconsiderados em 
outras partes do mundo. Este artigo analisa a nova fase do debate nos 
Estados Unidos. Em parte, é a continuação de um trabalho anterior sobre 
a inovação no regime de crescimento dominado pelas finanças, que se 
instalou a partir do fim dos anos 1980. Foi escrito recordando conversas 
com Fabio que percorriam um e outro assunto. 
ABSTRACT
The US still has the strongest R&D base in the world and enjoys clear 
leadership in military technologies. Google, Apple and Microsoft have a 
near to total global control of information flows. Behind this situation, 
however, the work done by lucid US researchers raise important issues, re-
lated notably to the effects of financialization which are often overlooked 
elsewhere in the world. This paper examines the new phase in the US 
debate. It is partly a follow-up to a previous work on innovation in the 
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finance-dominated growth regime, which set in from the late 1980s on-
wards. It has been written with the memory of conversations with Fabio 
which would go from one subject to another. 
INTRODUCTION
The United States is the keystone of the world capitalist system and Wall Street 
is with the City the headquarters of finance. It is also the main, if not the only 
Western country in which a broad public debate, highly polemical at times, 
has been going on for over twenty years about the relationships between 
science, technology and innovation and the main institutions of capitalism, 
government, corporations, finance and universities. In terms of the number 
of economists, scientists and political scientists participating in the debate and 
the number of issues broached, there is no equivalent in Europe. The debate 
started with the irruption of Japanese products and direct investment in the 
US domestic market at the end of the 1980s. Some years later it rebounded 
when the process of financialization, notably in its dimensions of corporate 
governance and shareholder value maximization, began to have an impact 
on Research and Development (R&D) and innovation-related investment. In 
the 1990s the extension of patenting to living organisms and to university re-
search more generally, deemed necessary for industrial corporations, gave rise 
to a further parallel debate on their likely long-term effects on the "Scientific 
Commons" and so on the vitality of research1 not only in the USA, but also 
elsewhere. Since 2005 or so, number of papers and essays by US academics, 
besides several government or quasi-government reports, have given a new 
impetus to this debate. The reasons for the vivacity of the US debate are not 
hard to understand. From the Second World War onwards, the US’s leadership 
in science and technology was one of the main pillars, if not the most im-
1 See in particular Nelson (2004).
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portant one, of its hegemony, first within the non-Communist world and 
then, after 1990, in the global economy and political society. 
This paper examines the new phase in the US debate. It is partly a fol-
low-up to previous work on innovation in the finance-dominated growth 
regime, which set in from the late 1980s onwards, in particular to the con-
tribution written for the 2000 RedeSist-UFRJ conference with Catherine 
Sauviat on the particularities of the US system, notably its unique venture 
capital market [Chesnais and Sauviat (2003)].2 The status of the paper is 
that of an essay. It has been written with the memory of conversations with 
Fabio which would go from one subject to another. I had first met Fabio at 
the March 1986 Venice Conference on Innovation Diffusion and later in Rio 
or in Paris had many discussions with him over a coffee or a glass of wine. 
In this essay then, I will start by rapidly explaining how what started as an 
essentially US-specific finance-dominated growth regime has led to financial-
ization as a historical world epoch. The following sections (second to sixth) 
pursue the first argument. I start by summarizing some recent provocative ar-
guments put forward again by Robert Gordon in an academic paper [Gordon 
(2012)], and also by Tyler Cowen for a wider audience [Cowen (2011)]. Both 
authors examine a number of broad factors that could explain why the US has 
experienced a falling rate of innovation and certainly a diminishing impact of 
innovation on growth. Several factors discussed by them concern other Orga-
nization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) economies and 
some could begin to be relevant in countries belonging to the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa). The policy responses given by the US 
Federal Administration, despite an underlying implicit recognition of the fac-
tors at work, will then be presented in the third section and their timidity 
shown. I will then return, in the fourth section, to a major issue discussed in 
2 See also Chesnais (2006).
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the 2000 paper pertaining to the effects of the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act on uni-
versity research since it remains very topical in the US debate on its weakening 
competitiveness in science and technology. The performance of the venture 
capital market after the 2001 crash on NASDAQ will then be examined in 
the fifth section. Finally, in the sixth section, I look at some of the evidence 
concerning the scale and effects of offshoring and outsourcing of R&D by US 
corporations under the regime of shareholder value maximization. In the sev-
enth section, I turn to the infinitely more important issue of global warming.
FINANCIALIZATION, A MANY-FACETED 
PHENOMENON 
In the 2003 paper written with Catherine Sauviat, the notion of the set-
ting-in of a "finance-dominated accumulation regime" structured our re-
search. Four main features received particular stress: a jump in the degree 
of direct subordination of the State to capital; the shareholder control of 
investment-related decisions; a global competitive regime dominated by 
transnational corporations (TNCs); and finance-dominated patterns of in-
come distribution [Chesnais and Sauviat (2003)]. The question was also ex-
amined whether there were factors in the technological base which could 
be providing an essentially predatory financial regime an element of sus-
tainability over a certain period. At the time, the notion of an accumula-
tion or growth regime dominated by financial investors and financial mar-
kets was only really held by the French École de la régulation and a few 
Anglo-Saxon industrial economists such as Mary O’Sullivan and William 
Lazonick (2000). Over the last seven or eight years this has changed. Partic-
ularly since 2008, the notion of financialization has attracted considerable 
attention and been an object of much more research than before. 
Many definitions of financialization have been given. Gerald Epstein 
has offered a list [Epstein (2005)]. It includes uses of the term to mean 
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(1) the ascendancy of ‘shareholder value’ as a mode of corporate gov-
ernance (this is shared by Marxist and non-Marxist left-wing economists 
alike [O’Sullivan and Lazonick (2000); Deeg and O’Sullivan (2009)]; (2) the 
explosion of financial trading with a myriad of new financial instruments; 
(3) the huge political and economic power of the financial elite or oli-
garchy [Palley (2007)], and as proposed by Epstein himself more broadly 
(4) the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial ac-
tors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and inter-
national economies. The last definition listed by Epstein is that (5) of a pat-
tern of accumulation in which profit making occurs increasingly through 
financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production. 
This is contradicted both by theory and facts. What is commonly named 
"wealth" (value and surplus in the Marxist terminology) can only be cre-
ated through the production and successful commercialization of goods 
and services. When financial investors – banks and investment funds – 
succeed in building a hold on economic activity, a very large part of this 
wealth is channeled to financial markets in the form of interest on loans 
to governments, firms and households and of dividend. These markets are 
the theatre of intense competition on the part of banks and their traders 
and of fund managers to object of which (even if this is not understood by 
participants or most observers) is to get as big as possible share of the total 
flow of interest and dividend. The outcome of this competition (which re-
quires an important dose of collusion, as an unending list of major "scan-
dals," not least the rigging of the Libor, has shown) appears in the balance 
sheets of financial corporations as profits. But these are fictitious profits.3 
Financial markets do not create value and surplus, but only organize an 
unceasing series of risk shifting and redistributing operations.
3 See in Brazil the research by Reinaldo Carcanholo, Paulo Nakatani and Mauricio Sabadini at 
the Federal University of Espírito Santo,Vitória.
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In a filiation with Marx and Hilferding, my own definition of financial-
ization is that of an economic and political configuration or indeed as an 
epoch, in which the extremely high centralization and concentration both 
of money capital and industrial capital, along with an increasingly dense 
intermeshing between the two, have placed accumulation and extended 
reproduction under the sway of the organizations that embody what Marx 
names interest-bearing capital. This is capital in the form of stock and 
bonds (e.g. fictitious capital from the point of view of real investment), 
which is bent on rent-like or rent-related appropriation as much as on 
value and surplus-creation. This configuration is conducive to extremely 
high degrees of income and wealth distribution (the gap between the 1% 
and the 99%). It is founded on three pillars: the servicing of government 
debt (and to a lesser degree now of household debt) and so of wealth 
channeled directly to banks and funds; an ever more diversified range of 
methods of predatory surplus appropriation developed by TNCs for the 
benefit of their shareholders and the unabated exploitation of the Plan-
et’s non-renewable resources by mining and agro-industrial corporations, 
whatever the consequences. 
After falling a little during two years, the data shows that interest and 
dividend-earning capital has succeeded in "decoupling" itself from real ac-
cumulation [with world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth taken as a 
proxy] and even to regain the ground lost during 2008-2009. In its 2011 
survey of financial assets, the McKinsey Global Institute considers that while 
the "2008 financial crisis and worldwide recession had halted a three-de-
cade expansion of global capital and banking markets, growth has resumed, 
fueled by expansion in developing economies, in addition to a $ 4.4 tril-
lion increase in sovereign debt" [McKinsey Global Institute (2011, p. 3)]. 
The diversification and intensification of predatory surplus appropriation by 
TNCs led the 2011 edition of the UNCTAD annual report to focus on what 
it names "non-equity modes of international production." These are said to 
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include contract manufacturing, services outsourcing, contract farming, fran-
chising, licensing, management contracts and other types of contractual rela-
tionships through which TNCs coordinate activities in their global value chains 
(GVCs) and influence the management of host-country firms without owning 
an equity stake in those firms [UNCTAD (2011, chapter 3)]. 
The relationships between banks and investment funds and oil, mining 
and agro-industrial corporations are extremely close. On the London Stock 
Exchange oil, mining and banking head the listing and are the market’s 
main support. Fighting global warming is not their priority and governments 
eventually ready to do so will not, to say the least have their support. 
FALTERING INNOVATION AND THE HYPOTHESIS  
OF A "TECHNOLOGICAL PLATEAU"
I now come to the main strand in this essay, namely that if the hypothesis 
of a "technological plateau" is accepted then financialization, in the case 
of the United States at least, is aggravating its possible consequences. The 
pieces written by Robert Gordon and Tyler Cowen on the possible faltering 
of innovation and certainly its weakening effect on growth have provoked 
a lot of debate. If they had been written by Europeans they would have 
been brushed aside as mere expressions of "euro-pessimism." They voice 
concerns which are largely shared by a part of the US scientific commu-
nity and of the stable non-partisan part of the Washington government 
structures, revealing issues about which pessimism is shared by both sides 
of the Atlantic. Given the US’s previous excellence in technology and the 
central place it still largely occupies in the world economy they are the ob-
ject of concern for those who look for US leadership.4 Gordon challenges 
4 !e City’s anxiety is voiced in two articles on !e Growing Debate about Dwindling Innova-
tion, e Economist, January 12-18, 2013.
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the doxa dating back to Solow’s work in the 1950s on growth as continu-
ous process that could persist forever [Gordon (2012)].5 His arguments are 
also in sharp contrast with the expectations of a new Great Technological 
Surge based on IT as defended by Perez (2007). 
Gordon’s approach starts with a distinction between major inventions 
amounting to industrial revolutions and the subsequent "incremental im-
provements which ultimately tap the full potential of the initial invention" 
[Gordon (2012, p. 2)]. He reserves the term innovation for the second. 
Coming back to a thesis that he first presented in 2000, Gordon argues 
that following the first two industrial revolutions (that of the late 18th and 
first half of the 19th spread over eighty years and the shorter in time one 
of the late 19th century), the incremental innovation follow-up process 
lasted at least 100 years the second overlapping with the first. His most 
central point is the "once and for all" character of the major technolog-
ical changes: "Taking the inventions and their follow-up improvements 
together, many of these processes could happen only once. Notable ex-
amples are speed of travel, temperature of interior space, and urbaniza-
tion itself." Gordon numbers three "industrial revolutions," while Carlota 
Perez counts five which she names "technological." The two agree in their 
identification of the computer and Internet revolution as being the latest 
one. However, while Perez sees a huge potential for growth from IT and 
views the surge as still having to come, Gordon considers that the IT-based 
industrial revolution is largely over. He had already argued in his first paper 
that the increase in productivity growth outside the ICT industries did not 
exceed 0.4 per cent per annum in the late 1990s. Moreover, it was con-
fined to durables. In services and in non-manufacturing industry, there had 
been either stagnation or decline in total factor productivity. In his paper 
5 !e main relevant Solow reference is Robert Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Pro-
duction Function, Review of Economics and Statistics, 39, 1957.
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for the 2000 RedeSist conference, Christopher Freeman noted that for 
Gordon "the new paradigm story for the US economy has been greatly 
exaggerated" [Freeman (2003, p. 1)]. Gordon is still more certain of this 
than in 2000. The IT-based industrial revolution 
began around 1960 and reached its climax in the dot.com era of the late 
1990s, but its main impact on productivity has withered away in the past eight 
years. Many of the inventions that replaced tedious and repetitive clerical labor 
by computers happened a long time ago, in the 1970s and 1980s. Invention 
since 2000 has centered on entertainment and communication devices that are 
smaller, smarter, and more capable, but do not fundamentally change labor 
productivity or the standard of living in the way that electric light, motor cars, 
or indoor plumbing changed it (2012, p. 2). 
Gordon also stresses the large number of labor-saving improvements 
made possible by electronics long before the invention and diffusion of the 
Internet in the late 1990s.
Tyler Cowen shares by and large Gordon’s assessment of IT and the In-
ternet. He considers that while the Internet has been fantastic for the intel-
lectually curious, its direct employment effects are very weak and it has done 
little to raise material standards of living. According to Cowen (2011), we 
have a collective historical memory that technological progress brings a big 
and predictable stream of revenue growth across most of the economy, but, 
when it comes to the Web, those assumptions are turning out to be wrong 
or misleading. Both authors consider factors which drove economic growth 
for most of America’s history are to a large extent spent. Cowen uses the 
expression "technological plateau" and points to the "low-hanging fruit" 
which made rapid growth easy, including the cultivation of much previously 
unused land; the application and spread of what he views much like Gordon 
as "once and for all" technological breakthroughs, notably electricity, mass 
communications, refrigeration and sanitation and finally mass education. 
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In emerging or developing countries, including, in this respect, BRICS 
with the traits of underdevelopment which linger on with differing de-
grees of acuity, the diffusion process fed by Gordon’s last two industrial 
revolutions is not over. Nor has the growth potential of mass education 
really begun to taped save in China. In this respect, they can still enjoy a 
part of the low-hanging fruit on condition that the appropriate economic 
and social conditions are created. For some BRICS, new intensive uses of 
land represent a transitory low-hanging fruit, the exploitation of which, 
under the sway of the most strongly rentier segments of financial capital, 
serves to delay the creation of such conditions. 
US POLICY RESPONSES TO DECLINING INNOVATION 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF FINANCE
Gordon and Cowen voice concerns which are shared by the stable 
non-partisan segments of US government. Government or quasi-gov-
ernment reports recently published contain related figures on R&D ex-
penditures which have implications for US’s leadership in science and 
technology. On the face of things the situation seems satisfactory (most 
OECD countries would be triumphal about them!). The 2012 edition 
of the National Science Foundation’s Science and Engineering Statistics 
reports that "over the last five years (2004-2009), annual growth in US 
R&D spending averaged 5.8%, compared to annual average growth of 
3.3% for US GDP." It immediately adds that "indeed, over the last sev-
eral decades, average annual growth in R&D spending has substantially 
outpaced that of GDP." This implies the absence of a positive relation-
ship between. The report does not offer any explanation. Besides the 
long-recognized difficulties stemming from the reporting of their R&D 
by firm, the lack of positive relationship could reflect the lack of invest-
ment opportunities in a phase dominated by financial devices for sup-
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porting the single housing market. Further explanations arise from the 
analysis in later sections. It also reports that development is by far the 
largest component of US R&D, that business sector funding of basic re-
search in university labs "declined steeply after the 1990s" leaving the 
federal government do all the funding. A point of concern on the part 
of the NSF is that "academic R&D has also long been concentrated in 
just a few S&E fields. For decades, more than half of all academic R&D 
spending has been in the life sciences" [National Science Foundation 
(2012, chapter 5)]. The highest representatives of the scientific commu-
nity have repeatedly expressed their anxieties about changing corporate 
innovation-investment-related priorities in the context of globalization 
and called for increased federal funding of basic research and scientific 
education. In 2005, the US National Academy of Sciences, the US Na-
tional Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine published 
report entitled "Rising above the Gathering Storm."6 In a 2010 update, 
the gathering storm was said to be approaching "force category 5." De-
spite the reference to the hurricane, the report is not about the threats of 
climate change or about the pursuit of scientific endeavor in the general 
interest. Very prosaically, it calls for increased spending to offset the fall 
in US competitiveness in not only science as measured by scientific pub-
lications, but also patenting by US corporations. It pleads for long-term 
investment in science (a ten per cent annual increase in federal funding 
of basic scientific research for seven years) and in scientific and techni-
cal education and points to the different ways in which commitments 
to increased federal support were not met even before 2008. The key 
question of the subordination of science to the market and the need to 
assess the effects of the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act on the working of the uni-
versities is not even raised despite the warnings to which we turn below. 
6 National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medici-
ne (2005). I will refer to it as 2005 Joint Academies Report.
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The offshoring of laboratories by US corporations and the outsourcing to 
Asia of much of their development activities using the facilities of ITCs 
are deplored but not really questioned because it would mean challeng-
ing corporate management strategies under the regime of maximization 
of shareholder value and moving away, if only a little, from the accepted 
canons of finance capital-dominated government policy making. 
The timidity and defensive character of the responses express the 
power relationships between financial capital and government and more 
fundamentally those between capital and labor of course. This is par-
ticularly true of the long and in appearance ambitious report put out 
in 2012 by the Department of Commerce on "US Competitiveness and 
Innovative Capacity" [US Department of Commerce (2012)]. It lists six 
"alarms" which should justify massive federal investment in science and 
technology, education and infrastructures. The report was prepared in 
the lead up to the presidential elections and so the alarms are listed in an 
order corresponding to the needs of Obama’s campaign. First, employ-
ment ("the United States’ ability to create jobs has deteriorated during 
the past decade"); second, wages and the situation of the "middle class 
which has struggled as incomes and wages have generally stagnated;" 
third, the erosion since 2002 of the US’s trade surplus in "advanced tech-
nology products," (biotechnology products computers, semiconductors 
and robotics) with an $ 81 billion trade deficit in 2010 (the 2002-2010 
period is exactly that of the Bush-Greenspan priorities on war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and debt-enhancement in housing and construction but the 
parallel is not made); fourth, innovation "after reviewing 16 key indi-
cators, number of scientists and engineers, corporate and government 
R&D, venture capital, productivity, and trade performance etc., the July 
2011 Atlantic Century report indicated that the United States had made 
little or no progress in its competitiveness since 1999;" fifth, education 
(the "United States is struggling to prepare US students in math and 
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science"); and finally, infrastructure ("delays at airports, time lost in traf-
fic jams, bridges in need of repair, and ports that cannot handle the new-
est ships exemplify how traditional infrastructure in the United States has 
failed to keep pace with its growing population").
These six "alarms" do not lead the Department of Commerce to take 
an offensive stance. It almost apologizes for advocating increased feder-
al investment. Just to take the example of science and technology, the 
report starts by absolving finance and industry from any responsibility in 
underinvestment in R&D. One of the most reactionary tenets of neoclas-
sical doctrine is called on, namely the theory of public goods and the di-
vergence between social and private returns to investments due to the 
free availability or non-excludability of scientific knowledge, to absolve 
business. "It may not be possible for those conducting basic research to 
fully appropriate the benefits from research and innovation" since "the 
social benefits (those that accrue to society as a whole) from these inno-
vative activities are likely exceed the private benefits (those that accrue 
just to the entity conducting the research)" [US Department of Commerce 
(2012, chapter 3)].7 This is why basic research must be funded publicly 
and the results made available to firms which can then privatize them 
in ways and at a pace defined by corporate strategies. The report’s main 
argument for increased federal spending thus consists essentially of a long 
reminder list of the key innovations due to federal R&D and procurement 
along with the names of the corporations that built their profits on them: 
the transistor in the Bell Labs at the time of ATT (American Telephone & 
Telegraph Company); semiconductors with Intel, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, 
7 “A series of studies show a stark divergence between private and social returns to R&D (see 
table 3.1). !e social return measured in these studies includes the private rate of return plus 
the change in pro"t due to R&D spillovers either within an industry or between industries. Be-
cause individual researchers cannot recoup the full value of their work, the incentive to produce 
a socially optimal amount of innovative activity is lacking” [US Department of Commerce 
(2012, chapter 3)].
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and Texas Instruments as major beneficiaries;8 Internet and Google;9 the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and "the creation and expansion of the 
biotechnology industry." Here the report cites Genentech (fully owned by 
Hoffman-La Roche since 2009) as the most striking success. But it also 
gives more recent examples such as Protea Biosciences, which holds a 
dominant position in protein-coding genes with the backing of NIH fund-
ing. It is interesting to note that while defense R&D accounts for 58% of 
US federal outlays, the examples of technological spillovers given in the 
report date back to the late 1980s. 
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Source: SEI 2012: Federal Spending on Research by Field, Chapter 4. 
Note: 2009 data are preliminary.
The breakdown of federal funding of R&D by science and engineering 
fields gives a good indication where priorities shaped by preoccupations 
8 Flamm’s well-known work on the effectiveness of public financing and procurement is quoted: 
Kenneth Flamm, Targeting the Computer: Government Support and International Competition, 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987. The report mentions Intel as “having invested 
$ 17 million in the venture and then reported saving $ 200 to $ 300 million as a result of 
improved yields and greater production efficiencies.”
9 Here the report has a paragraph titled How the NSF seeded Google, and refers to a study by 
David Hart, “On the Origins of Google,” August 2004, <www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_summ.
jsp?cntn_id=100660>. 
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about military superiority (which is very understandable), competitiveness 
(that of the pharmaceutical industry particularly) and support to the ven-
ture capital market prevail over environmental or social objectives. The 
2005 Joint Academies Report pointed out the federal funding of research 
in the physical sciences as a percentage of GDP was 45% less in 2004 than 
in 1976. It talked about "shortsightedness" and "risk aversion" by federal 
funding agencies.10
THE IMPACTS OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT  
ON THE "SCIENTIFIC COMMONS"
What the Department of Commerce report both says and does not say 
about the effects on the US research system of the privatization of the re-
sults of basic research and the total silence of the Gathering Storm reports 
are significant of the damage wrought by the finance-dominated regime 
in the university research system. In 1980, a Supreme Court decision in the 
Diamond vs. Chakrabarty case laid down that genetically engineered life 
forms were patentable. The same year the privatization of scientific knowl-
edge generated in universities was enhanced by legislation. As stated in 
the preamble of the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, the aim was "to cut down on 
bureaucracy" in the access of business to the results of basic research and 
to "encourage private industry to utilize government financed inventions 
through the commitment of the risk capital necessary to develop such 
inventions to the point of commercial application."Expanded technolo-
gy commercialization was to be accomplished by "employing the patent 
10 “Many medical devices and procedures − such as endoscopic surgery, ‘smart’ pacemakers, kid-
ney dialysis, and magnetic resonance imaging − are the result of R&D in the physical scienc-
es, engineering, and mathematics. Many believe that federal funding agencies have become 
increasingly risk-averse and focused on short-term results. For example, even the generally 
highly effective Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has been criticized in 
this regard in congressional testimony” [National Academy of Sciences; National Academy of 
Engineering; Institute of Medicine (2005, p.32)].
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system to augment collaboration between universities (as well as other 
nonprofit institutions) and the business community and ensure that in-
ventions were brought to market" [Schacht (2009, p. 2)]. By 1988 the 
implications of the Act were sufficiently clear for Partha Dasgupta and 
Paul David to warn that economic growth under conditions of "privat-
ization of science" might continue to be grounded in the exploitation of 
scientific and technical knowledge, but it would lose its sustained char-
acter [Dasgupta and David (1988)]. In another study, Richard Florida ar-
gued that because universities were seen as "engines" of growth, they 
were focusing on applied rather than fundamental research. According to 
Florida (1999), national and local policies and practices were encouraging 
the commercialization of academic research at the expense of knowledge 
creation. By 2000, the assessment could be made that codes of behavior 
within academic institutions were rapidly eroding. Professors often owned 
stock in the companies that funded their work or accept extra rewards in 
the form of stock-options. Universities with research laboratories had set 
up technology-licensing offices to manage their patent portfolios,
often guarding their intellectual property as aggressively as business does and 
doing so in some cases against their own research staff. Universities with lim-
ited budgets are investing large resources in commercially oriented fields of 
research, while downsizing humanities departments and curbing expenditures 
on teaching. They had become eager co-capitalists, embracing market values 
as never before.11 
Today, the issue is as topical as ever. In one of the most recent assess-
ments of the situation the political scientist Philip Mirowski concludes 
that the harm done to science in the US (and of course in all countries 
following the US example) amounts to a qualitative degradation in the 
11 Press and Washburn (2000). This well-documented investigation was quoted extensively in 
Chesnais and Sauviat, op.cit. 
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special nature of the knowledge produced [Mirowski (2011)]. The 2010 
Department of Commerce report prefers to consider that the results of 
the Bayh-Dole Act are disappointing: a particular motive of concern is 
the "slowdown in commercialization of technologies by US universities 
since 2000." The Act 
was meant to provide a strong incentive for universities to offer useful technology 
to industry, who would then quickly transform it into products. By the late 1980s, 
university patenting, licensing of technology to industry, and the proliferation of 
university-linked startup companies all began to accelerate, reaching especially 
high growth rates in the late 1990s. However, the pace of these activities slowed 
starting in 2000, a slowdown that persisted after the brief recession of the early 
2000s [US Department of Commerce (2012, chapter 3)].
This is partly due to the retreat of venture capital after the NASDAQ 
2001 crash, which is examined below, but it may also be an indicator of 
dwindling patentable knowledge. One would have thus expected the 
Department of Commerce report to begin assessing the possible effects 
of the Bayh-Dole Act on the production of basic research and discussing 
at least the advisability of amending it. 
Work exists to this effect. In one of several articles on the effects of 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty and Bayh-Dole, Richard Nelson wrote in 2004 that 
while the privatization of the scientific commons is relatively limited, there 
are real dangers that, unless halted, soon significant portions of future scien-
tific knowledge will be private property and fall outside the public domain, 
and that could be a difficult for both the future progress of science, and 
for technological progress [Nelson (2004)]. Nelson argues that technological 
advance is a collective, cultural, evolutionary process. A strong body of sci-
entific understanding of a technology serves to enlarge and extend the area 
within which an inventor or problem solver can see relatively clearly and thus 
make informed judgments regarding what particular paths are promising as 
ESTRATÉGIAS DE DESENVOLVIMENTO, POLÍTICA INDUSTRIAL E INOVAÇÃO: 
ensaios em memória de Fabio Erber120
solutions, and which ones are likely to be dead ends. With regard to basic 
science "research outputs almost never are final products themselves, but 
have their principal use in further research, some of it aimed to advance 
the science farther, some to follow leads that may enable a useful prod-
uct or process to be found and developed." Thus his concern "about not 
hindering the ability of the scientific community, both that part interested 
in advancing the science farther, and that part interested in trying to use 
knowledge in the search for useful product, to work freely with and from 
new scientific findings" [Nelson (2004, p. 463)]. Nelson and his colleagues12 
call for amendments to the Bayh-Dole Act.13 This would have to be done in 
the general interest of the pursuit of science because of the creation, since 
the double turn of 1980, of strong vested interests: "Many university ad-
ministrators and researchers certainly would resist such an amendment, on 
the grounds that it would diminish their ability to maximize financial returns 
from their patent portfolio." Nelson (2004, p. 467) writes that "in the era 
since Bayh-Dole, universities have become a major part of the problem, av-
idly defending their rights to patent their research results, and license as they 
choose." Many have ceased "supporting the idea of a scientific commons, 
except in terms of their own rights to do research." Similarly, Philip Mirowski 
considers that the roots of academic commerce run deep. "Bayh-Dole was 
just one component in a whole range of roughly simultaneous ‘reforms’ 
being engineered into corporations, the government, and the universities, 
all calculated to instigate the marketplace of ideas throughout the entire cul-
ture" [Mirowski (2011, p. 149)]. If he or Nelson and his colleagues are right 
it is understandable that the committees that wrote the "Gathering storm" 
reports make no mention of Bayh-Dole. 
12 These include in particular law professors, notably Rebecca Eisenberg and Arti Rai.
13 Nelson writes that he sees the key as reforming Bayh-Dole. The objective, according to him, 
is not to eliminate university patenting, but rather to establish a presumption that university 
research results, patented or not, should as a general rule be made available to all that want to 
use them at very low transaction costs, and reasonable financial costs [Nelson (2004)].
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THE POST-2001 PERFORMANCE OF VENTURE 
CAPITAL FINANCING OF INNOVATION
The venture capital industry is finance capital’s original distinctive contri-
bution to the financing of R&D. From the mid-1990s on it became very 
central to the organization of funding in the USA. For a long time an 
exceptionally large part of total R&D expenditures financed by the federal 
government but performed in industry was a central feature of the US 
national innovation system. The 2005 Joint Academies Report notes the 
overall retreat of the large corporations: 
Some of the most important fundamental research in the 20th century was 
accomplished in corporate laboratories—Bell Labs, GE Research, IBM Research, 
Xerox PARC, and others. Since that time, the corporate research structure has 
been significantly eroded. One reason might be the challenge of capturing the 
results of research investments within one company or even a single nation on 
a long-term basis [National Academy of Sciences; National Academy of Engi-
neering; Institute of Medicine (2005, p.32)].14 
This retreat does not show up in the figures. On the contrary from 
the early 1990s onwards, on account of venture capital’s interest in in-
novative dot.com and biotech firms, the share of total funding financed 
by the private sector grew very fast. Business R&D outlays represented 
70% of total US R&D expenditure in 1999. It then fell for five years be-
fore remaining on a plateau until the new drop in 2009 on account of the 
2008-09 financial crisis and economic recession [National Science Founda-
tion (2012, chapter 4)]. The increase in the business funding of R&D in the 
1990s took place during the very period in which the doctrine of share-
holder value was taking complete hold over the management of corpo-
rations and the "short-termism" denounced by a wing of US economists 
14 See also Chris Freeman (2003). 
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[Dertouzos et al. (1989)]. The support of R&D by venture capital does not 
belie "short-termism." It involves a change in the actors and in the locus and 
nature of decisions shaping the future of research projects. R&D carried out 
in corporate laboratories declines. Corporations quoted on the Stock market 
can buy back shares rather than invest in R&D [Lazonick (2012a; 2012b)]. 
The uncertainties and risks inherent to research are assumed by venture cap-
italists. They become closely linked to financial speculation and a significant 
part of funding depends on the state of financial markets. 
The venture capital financing of R&D requires a very specific set of sys-
temic relationships. Both the evolution of the venture capital market over the 
past decade and data published recently on the annual rate of startups make 
their degree of fragility clearer than in 2000. For a venture capital industry to 
emerge one must first have a strong and regular flow of talented scientist and 
engineers in a position to "walk out of the door" of university laboratories 
with their patents and their specific knowledge or again to negotiate their 
departure from large corporations in order to set up, with the help of venture 
capital, their own company in the expectation of large financial rewards. For 
this to take place the law and the practice of the academic world must first 
have undergone the changes that make this "migration" legally possible if 
not encouraged and on the whole accepted and even envied within academia 
as an institution. But for the flow to be regular and venture capital firms kept 
interested the "rate of production" of new knowledge must not abate.
Venture capital firms are specialized intermediaries between the small 
or very technology-intensive or "laboratory-type" firms and financial in-
vestors decided on using part of their funds to make high-risk investments 
in a range of markets including technology. Venture capitalists use the 
funds placed under their management plus those that they borrow to pro-
vide investment finance dedicated to start-ups or early-stage innovative 
companies with high growth potential high technology development. In 
the 1990s, pension funds were far the largest investor groups, holding 
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roughly 40% of capital outstanding and supplying close to 50% of all new 
funds raised by partnerships.15 The last condition that must be satisfied is 
ease of exit for venture capital through an initial public offering (IPO) of 
shares on specialized markets or the sale of the firm to a large corporation. 















































































































BIOTECHNOLOGY ALTERNATIVE ENERGY COMPUTER SOFTWARE INTERNET SPECIFIC
Source: Mustafa Erdem Sakinç, unpublished research, University of Bordeaux, 2013, 
on the basis of data published by Thomson Reuters.
As can be seen from this figure, venture capital investment never re-
covered from the crash of the Internet bubble on NASDAQ. From 2003 
onwards speculative capital was more interested in mortgage than in tech-
nology. Levels of venture capital investments were only marginally affect-
ed by the busting of the housing bubble during the 2007-2008 financial 
episode of the on-going world economic and financial crisis. But as will 
be seen below the sharp fall in IPOs disrupted the venture capital system 
taken a whole. The distribution among the four broad industry groupings 
became more balanced after the bursting of the dot.com bubble with the 
evident exception of alternative energy. Misgivings about biotechnology 
funding will be discussed below. 
15 At the time, CalPERS had 117 venture capital partnerships valued at $ 7,5 billion in commit-
ments, of which $ 4,1 billion has been invested, cf. Pension & Investment, June 14, 1999, p. 20.
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Venture capital investment is broken down between early stage invest-
ment (seed, startup), expansion or "second round financing" which pro-
vides working capital for company expansion preparatory to initial public 
offering and later stage investment which includes acquisition-financing 
and management and leverage buyouts. In 2004, the National Science 
Foundation stressed that "contrary to popular perception, only a relatively 
small amount of dollars invested by venture capital funds ends up as seed 
money to support research or early product development." In the latest 
2012 report, the assessment is that
venture capital investment has become generally more conservative during 
the 2000s. Later stage venture capital investment has both grown in absolute 
terms and as a share of total investment. The shift to later stage, more con-
servative investing has been attributed to a desire for lowered investment risk, 
higher minimum investment levels, a shorter time horizon for realizing gains, 
a decline in yields of venture capital investment, and the sharp decline in IPOs 
and acquisitions of venture capital-backed firms, which has required venture 
capital investors to provide additional rounds of financing. [National Science 
Foundation (2012, Chap. 6, p. 59)].
The report adds that "another possibility is that venture capital investor 
behavior changed because fewer opportunities for attractive risky investments 
were available in the 2000s than in the 1990s." [National Science Foundation 
(2012, Chap. 6, p. 71)]. The following figure published by the Bureau of Cen-
sus is included in the Department of Commerce report with the commentary 
that it could mean that "fewer would-be entrepreneurs are raising to the chal-
lenges of turning new ideas into new businesses" [US Department of Com-
merce (2012, Chap. 7, p. 6)].16 But it can also be interpreted as an indication 
of the validity of the "technological plateau" hypothesis and the legitimacy of 
the fears regarding the weakening of the scientific commons. 
16 Another figure from the US Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies, showing the same 
fall is included.
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FIRM STARTUP RATE AVERAGE SIZE OF STARTUPS (RIGHT AXIS)
Source: US Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies, Business Dynamics Statistics Briefing: Where Have All 
the Young Firms Gone? Available at: <https://www.ces.census.gov/docs/bds/BDS_Jobs_Created_ces.pdf>.
The particular case of venture capital in the biotech sector has been 
subjected to much analysis, starting with that of Gary Pisano, professor 
at the Harvard Business School. In the 1990s the biotech sector attracted 
more genuine early stage investment (seed, startup) than other industries. 
Subsequently it appeared to "be retreating from its distinctive position 
at the radical and risky end of the R&D spectrum" [Pisano (2006)].17 The 
bursting of the Internet bubble coincided and aggravated the effects of 
the rise of strong disillusions about time-horizons and expectations of re-
turns in the support of genomics (the mapping of human genes and re-
sulting therapies). Industry specialists even refer to a "genomics bubble"18 
the bursting of which in 2001 went unremarked on account of the Inter-
net collapse. After 2001, the strategies of startups and the preferences of 
venture capitalists underwent 
17 This article in the Harvard Business Review condenses the findings and conclusions of the Gary 
Pisano’s book, Science business: the promise, the reality, and the future of biotech, Harvard Business 
School Press, 2006.
18 See inter alia, Ball (2010).
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a marked change. Rather than forming so-called molecule-to-market compa-
nies, whose first product revenues might be more than a decade away, entre-
preneurs and investors began to look for lower-risk, faster-payback models, 
such as licensing existing projects and products from other companies and then 
refining them [Pisano (2006, p. 118)].
Given the importance acquired by the venture capital market, "the change 
in strategies raises a major concern: If young biotech firms are not pursuing 
cutting-edge science that will focus on the higher-risk long-term projects that 
offer potential medical breakthroughs?" [Pisano (2006, p. 118)]. 
In an interview, Pisano put his findings and assessment very bluntly: 
Science and business work differently. They have different cultures, values, and 
norms. For instance, science holds methods sacred; business cherishes results. 
Science should be about openness; business is about secrecy. Science demands 
validity; business requires utility. So, the tensions are deep. What has happened 
is that we have tried to mash these two worlds together in biotech and may 
not be doing either very well. Science could be suffering and business certainly 
is suffering. If you try to take something that is science, and then jam it into 
normal business institutions, it just doesn’t work that well for either science or 
business [Silverthorne (2006, p. 1)]. 
In a follow-up to Pisano, the particularities of venture capital funding 
of biopharmaceutical R&D and the perspectives of this industry have been 
investigated in research led by William Lazonick. In a paper with Öner Tulum, 
he finds that the greatest vulnerability comes from lack of liquidity in overall 
unfavorable financial market conditions of firms that are quasi-financial as-
sets. Investors will put money into firms whose sole "capital" is knowledge, 
only if exit through IPOs is guaranteed [Lazonick and Tulum (2011)]. 
As shown in this figure made by Mustafa Erdem Sakinç in ongoing PhD 
research supervised by Lazonick in biotech, the IPO market never really 
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recovered from the 2000 crash on NASDAQ. In 2008 and 2009 it was bad-
ly hit by the subprime crisis and then the September 2008 panic after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers. Indeed, the IPO market practically disappeared 
before reviving a little. Lazonick and Tulum doubt whether the emergence 
of the small numbers of successful drugs from biopharmaceutical research 
would have occurred without NIH funding. They raise the question of the 
social costs of leaving the application of findings stemming from public 
funding in the hands of firms particularly subjected to the state of financial 
markets. The funding criteria of the NIH itself was scrutinized by the 2005 
Joint Academies Report and found to be very conservative.19


































































































































Source: Mustafa Erdem Sakinç, unpublished research, University of Bordeaux, 2013, 
on the basis of data published by Thomson Reuters.
19 “The average age at which a principal investigator receives his or her first grant is 42 years −
partly because of requirements for evidence of an extensive 'track record' to reduce risk to the 
grant-makers. But reducing the risk for individual research projects increases the likelihood 
that breakthrough, 'disruptive' technologies will not be found. History suggests that young 
researchers make disproportionately important discoveries. The NIH recognizes this concern, 
but the amount of funds devoted to long-term, high-payoff, high-risk research remains very 
limited” [Lazonick and Tulum (2011, p. 33)].
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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OFFSHORING  
AND OUTSOURCING AND THE US  
"INDUSTRIAL COMMONS"
We must now look at a part of the discussion and data concerning the 
scale and effects of offshoring and outsourcing of R&D by US corporations 
under the regime of shareholder value maximization. A theme which has 
been heatedly debated among economists in American business schools is 
the deteriorated state of the US "industrial commons." By this term, Gary 
Pisano and his colleague at the Harvard Business School Willy Shih mean 
the "R&D and manufacturing infrastructure, know-how, process-devel-
opment skills, and engineering capabilities resulting from the clustering 
of universities, suppliers, and manufacturers" [Pisano and Shih (2009, 
p. 1)]. They consider that their case-study research shows that in industries 
where constant interaction between R&D and manufacturing is important, 
notably in those where rapidly-developing innovations in processes and 
process technologies are taking place, the outsourcing of manufacturing 
to other countries proves to be destructive not only to the innovative pro-
cess in the individual firm, but also to the industrial commons of a whole 
set of firms. Pisano and Shih argue against the "prevailing view that the 
migration of mature manufacturing industries away from developed coun-
tries is just part of a healthy, natural process of economic evolution that 
allows resources to be redeployed to new, higher-potential businesses." It 
simply "ignores the fact that new cutting-edge high-tech products often 
depend in some critical way on the commons of a mature industry. Lose 
that commons, and you lose the opportunity to be the home of the hot 
new businesses of tomorrow." This article sparked off a strong blog de-
bate20 leading to a book in which Pisano and Shih sum up their replies to 
their critics [Pisano and Shih (2012)]. For economists and political scientists 
20 Available at: <blogs.hbr.org/hbr/restoring-american-competitiveness/2009/11/>.
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who have long worked on technology, many points made are a little 
déjà-vu: the benefits of industrial and technological clustering for instance 
(Italian industrial districts are cited) or the imperatives of close interaction 
between R&D and on-site production. But after nearly three decades of 
neoliberal-neoclassical domination these ideas are welcome and their re-
appearance a sign of the many impasses experienced in the heartland of 
world capitalism. 
The issue raises two questions: first, did the US ever really have, bar-
ing a few exceptions, true "industrial commons" as defined by Pisano 
and Shih and second, is their destruction or significant weakening the 
straightforward result of liberalization and globalization or must they be 
attributed specifically to financialized corporate management as it has 
developed over the past three decades? Only American scholars can an-
swer the first question. I will attempt to sort out the second a little. Two 
of the consequences of liberalization and globalization taken together 
are the increased opportunities for foreign direct investment (FDI) and 
the intensification of oligopolistic rivalry in truly global markets. FDI by 
TNCS has always called for and been accompanied by the setting up of 
R&D facilities of the variety named support labs doing work adapting 
production to local conditions, primary inputs but more generally cus-
tomers habits and so markets. Once this is considered, then TNC R&D 
investment in countries with large and expanding markets is first and of-
ten remains the straightforward result of their FDI. The upgrading of R&D 
capacities follows the increased sophistication of domestic demand and 
the growth of the competitiveness of local firms. The other dimension of 
globalization is the intensification of competition as domestic oligopoly 
gives way to global oligopoly. In industries where as studied by Deiter 
[Ernst (2009)] the "modularization" of engineering, development and 
research can be organized, the setting up or upgrading of foreign labora-
tories may become part of networking strategies by TNCs confronted by 
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acute oligopolistic rivalry. These factors in combination with wage levels, 
skill availability and attractive economies of agglomeration can well push 
TNCs to offshore part of the overall corporate R&D. These patterns cor-
respond largely to those of US TNC R&D investment in China.
The first and still the most complete account of foreign direct invest-
ment in R&D facilities and the setting up of laboratories abroad was pub-
lished by UNCTAD in 2005 [UNCTAD (2005, chapter 5)]. No data com-
parable in detail covering the main host and home countries has been 
published since. However China has been well researched as a host coun-
try meaning that data exists, while the US has surveyed regularly the for-
eign R&D activities of its TNCs. This makes it possible to measure the scale 
and discuss some of the features of US TNC R&D investment in China. The 
latest US data indicates that the share of US-owned affiliates R&D per-
formed in China rose from a half percentage point or less in 1997 to 4% in 
2008.21 The findings of research led by Nannan Lundin in Sweden [Lundin 
and Serger (2007)] and work carried out by Li Yanhua for the BRICS-Rede-
Sist project [Yanhua (2013)] indicate that adaptive R&D [UNCTAD (2005, 
chapter IV)] in support of FDI accounts for the largest part of foreign R&D 
activities in China. TNCs have then sought to take advantage of the large 
and growing pool of skilled engineers and technicians as well as cutting 
their overall research expenditures. A few have started to build R&D facili-
ties within globally integrated corporate structures along the modularized 
model; others have done so simply to increase their share of the market 
and fight off indigenous competitors. General Motors is a major example. 
The very large R&D facilities set up in China are globally integrated but 
21 The combined share of China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore in the overseas R&D ex-
penditures of U.S.-based multinational corporations (MNCs) ($37 billion in 2008) increased 
from 11% in 1998 to 20% in 2008. In 1998, about 83% of all overseas R&D by U.S.-head-
quartered MNCs took place in Europe and Canada; by 2008, their combined percentage had 
decreased to 74% (National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators 2012, 
chapter 4). 
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continue to be almost entirely devoted to adaptive work.22 In the setting 
up of R&D facilities by foreign firms, government pressure is also at work. 
In given industries, foreign investors are required to offer counterpart ac-
tivities notably, the transfer of technology and/or the commitment to in-
vest in R&D. The wholly owned affiliate is the main ownership mode of 
TNC R&D centers in high-technology industries. In such industries adaptive 
R&D can be sophisticated as with Chinese speech recognition software in 
which Motorola, Microsoft and Apple have all invested quite heavily. But 
the level of this investment must not be exaggerated. To get a sense of 
proportion, Motorola has the highest number of centers in China, yet its 
investment in China is only about 3% of its global R&D investment. On 
the Chinese side, Li Yanhua reports of current debates about the benefits 
of foreign R&D.23 But Ernst (2008) considers that while some quite large 
successful ITC firms such as ZTE, Huawei and Lenovo have emerged, they 
are still very small by global standards and that the real challenge facing 
the Chinese ICT sector is that of improving its integration into global net-
works. In my view, it would be important to set the Chinese situation in 
the framework of the "low-hanging fruit" it can still pick broadened to 
include the acquisition/appropriation of foreign technology.
22 See McKinsey, “Innovating in China’s automotive market: An interview with GM China’s pres-
ident,” February 2012, <www.mckinseyquarterly.com/>: “On the technical side, we’re actually 
able to leverage our international capabilities pretty well. Our global knowledge is broader and 
more expansive than what we have over here on any basis you want to use: powertrain, infotain-
ment, body structures, assembly processes. We’ve probably been able to do things out here in 
low-cost engineering that we wouldn’t have done anywhere else, simply because we’re in a market 
where the opportunity exists and the requirement exists. You have to go out and figure how you 
manage to innovate with new processes and practices, while maintaining the same standards that 
an international company has to maintain. That’s how we get a competitive advantage.” 
23 The Chinese government has so far actively encouraged and promoted foreign corporate R&D 
in China, viewing it as a way to upgrade domestic technology and skills by importing foreign 
know-how. However, skepticism regarding the positive impact of foreign corporate R&D on 
China’s innovation system has recently been increasing. Some academics and policymakers 
criticize foreign firms’ presence and their behavior in China, claiming that they charge unduly 
high license fees for their patents, “crowd out” domestic firms in the market for highly skilled 
labor, monopolize technology standards and thwart technology transfer and knowledge spill-
overs. Foreign firms are seen as dominating standards and technology platforms and reducing 
Chinese companies to the role of producers with low-profit margins.
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The effects of financialization as distinct from those of globalization, 
with its specific opportunities and constraints, are observable in offshor-
ing and outsourcing strategies with technological dimensions adopted 
by "New Economy" firms. Strategies bearing the mark of shareholder 
value maximization have been studied by two complementary approach-
es, one focusing, as in the case of Lazonick mainly on the structural fac-
tors behind the decline in US investment and only on innovation in a very 
broad manner [Lazonick (2012a; 2012b)] and the other more specifically 
on collective innovative capacity as that of Pisano and Shih. Shareholder 
value maximization corporate behavior helps to understand the other-
wise totally self-defeating US original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
corporate strategies of outsourcing to Asian firms. These have been 
studied by Pisano and Shih in the personal computer industry. US corpo-
rations among which Microsoft began simply by outsourcing the assem-
bly of printed circuit boards in the 1980s to contractors in South Korea, 
Taiwan, and China. Then product assembly began before reaching com-
plete product assembly. Given that many of the components were also 
sourced from Asia, a logical next step was to take over the management 
of the supply chain from their American customers. Finally, there came 
design-engineering tasks. The outcome is that by 2009 "nearly every US 
brand of notebook computer, except Apple, is designed in Asia, and the 
same is true for most cell phones and many other handheld electronic 
devices" [Pisano and Shih (2009)].
The 2005 Joint Academies Report deplores outsourcing but considers 
that nothing can be done about it: 
US companies that outsource information-technology jobs have all but or-
dered their contractors to send some portion of the work overseas to gain 
hiring flexibility, cut employment costs − by 40% in some cases ‒ and cut 
overhead costs for the home company. Offshoring has become established, 
however, and it is merely one logical outcome of a flatter world. Furthermore, 
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protectionist measures have historically proved counterproductive [National 
Academy of Sciences; National Academy of Engineering; Institute of Medicine 
(2005, p. 27-28)]. 
The strong propensity of "New Economy Firms" to embrace the tenet 
of shareholder value maximization is also clear in the offshoring of soft-
ware services and more importantly of software-development to India. In 
the software industry the development process starts with the identifi-
cation of a need, followed by the creation of a requirements definition, 
relating this definition to a software specification, designing the software, 
writing and coding, and then implementing and testing it [Davies (2004)]. 
Initially, US firms only outsourced code-writing projects to Indian firms 
so as to lower their development costs. Over time Indian companies de-
veloped their own software-engineering capabilities, won more complex 
work, like developing architectural specifications and writing sophisticated 
firmware and device drivers. They are now seen by US analysts as having a 
very central position in the world software program-writing industry. They 
have a very number of CMM Level 5 certified companies,24 several Indian 
IT services companies (TCS, Infosys and Wipro) are listed on the NYSE and 
NASDAQ and have acquired small US firms. They account for substantial 
part of US job creation in the industry. More importantly, from the stand-
point of the theory of the industrial commons, it is in Indian cities, Ban-
galore, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad, Mumbai and Pune that the virtuous 
innovation-friendly interactions and feedback mechanisms are at work. As 
put in a Congressional testimony, 
there is considerable evidence that R&D activities generate positive spillovers 
and that these spillovers are geographically limited in scope. For example, there 
24 The CMM (Capability Maturity Model) sets standards of excellence in software programing. 
It was originally created as a tool to evaluate the ability of US government contractors, notable 
the Department of Defense, to perform a contracted software project.
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is evidence that offshored R&D spurs domestic companies in the receiving na-
tions to increase their R&D, thereby increasing the competitive challenge to US 
firms. This is one of the reasons for the renewed interest around the world in 
regional ‘clusters’ of economic activity, particularly innovation-based economic 
activity. As a result, losing R&D means more than the loss of the actual R&D 
activities [Atkinson (2007, p. 8)].
In the same testimony, it is reported that the "R&D outsourcing mod-
el," if it can be called that, is contagious:
It’s not just large multinational firms that are offshoring R&D; small and mid-
sized technology firms are as well. One study of California-based technology 
firms (80 percent of which had less than 500 employees) found that R&D was 
actually the most common activity offshored, with around 60 percent of firms 
reporting that they offshore R&D, which is about twice the rate of manufactur-
ing offshoring and three times the rate of back office offshoring (p. 8). 
A Swedish study focused notably on the future of Silicon Valley and 
the Bay Area in San Francisco made the same finding. This is not done 
just by well-established firms but even by recently-started ones still owned 
by financial investors: "another important driving force is venture capi-
tal firms encouraging their portfolio companies to consider locating part 
of their business activities abroad in order to cut costs" [Franchi (2006, 
p. 201)]. Here we have the imperatives of "pure financial capital" in their 
starkest form.
CONCLUSION
The US still has the strongest R&D base in the world. It enjoys clear lead-
ership in military technologies, and Google, Apple and Microsoft have 
a near to total global control of information flows. But, behind this sit-
uation, which is of course more than a mere façade, the work done by 
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lucid US researchers raise important issues, related notably to the effects 
of financialization which are often overlooked elsewhere in the world. 
The faltering rate of innovation challenges quite radically the whole idea 
of economic growth as understood in mainstream economic thinking, 
namely growth based on an unlimited expansion of private needs in the 
form of goods and an unlimited availability of natural resources. The 
word "plateau" seems to be used increasingly. In its latest 2013 report, 
the McKinsey Global Institute expresses its concern that "although glob-
al financial assets have surpassed their pre-crisis totals, growth has hit a 
plateau. Their annual growth was 7.9 percent from 1990 to 2007, but 
that has slowed to an anemic 1.9 percent since the crisis." The authors 
are alarmed that global financial assets after having increased from 120 
percent in 1980 to 355 percent of global GDP in 2007 fell by 43 percent-
age points relative to GDP since the start of the crisis. They are even more 
concerned that their indicators of financial globalization (flows of loans, 
cross-border holdings of bonds and equity, foreign direct investment) 
reveal a certain degree of "retreat from globalization." This "retreat" 
could represent an opportunity and a challenge for countries over the 
world to direct their technological development in new directions on 
condition of course that they seek to free themselves as far as possible 
from the domination of the financial investor.
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